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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- DOUBLE JEOPARDY
WILL NOT BAR SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION
UNDER ALTERNATIVE OUI THEORYCOMMONWEALTH V. HEBB, 77 N.E3D 308 (MASS.

2017)
For a criminal defendant, a return verdict of not guilty and the
dismissal of a criminal complaint serve as great relief and signify the end of
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
prosecution.'
providing the longstanding safeguard protecting defendants from a second
prosecution for the same offense, is deeply ingrained in both the United
States and Massachusetts' justice systems.? In Commonwealth v. Hebb,3 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") addressed the issue of
whether Double Jeopardy principles precluded a retrial where the defendant
was prosecuted under the Massachusetts Operating Under the Influence
("OUI") statute, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 90, Section 24
("M.G.L. c. 90 § 24"), and the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on one
theory, however the judge declared a mistrial on the other.' The Court held
1 See Commonwealth v. Aldrich, 486 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (explaining
dismissal of complaints signifies end of prosecution for defendants). "Whether further prosecution
is contemplated has been referred to as 'the critical question' in determining whether a dismissal
without a defendant's consent bars further prosecution." Id. at 735. The critical question becomes
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation that the dismissal was a final disposition of the
charge. Id.
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (defining Double Jeopardy clause). The Fifth Amendment
provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 24 N.E.3d 1025, 1032 (Mass. 2015) (describing safeguards
of Double Jeopardy); see also Berry v. Commonwealth, 473 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (Mass. 1985)
(holding Massachusetts common law principles of Double Jeopardy provide greater protection than
United States Constitution).
3 77 N.E.3d 308 (Mass. 2017).
4 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (1)(a)(1) (2017) (outlining operating under the influence
statute); see also Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 310 (determining whether double jeopardy principles
precluded retrial).
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that an acquittal on a single theory was not an effective acquittal of both
violations, and thus Double Jeopardy principles did not preclude a retrial on
the second theory.'
On May 16, 2013, William J. Hebb was struck by a car while riding
his motorcycle.6
Hebb was taken to the Milford Hospital emergency department
where the physician made several observations which led him to determine
Hebb was intoxicated.7 While at the hospital, Hebb's blood was drawn and
tested for alcohol which yielded a .133 blood alcohol level.' Subsequently,
Hebb was charged under M.G.L. c. 90, § 24 (1)(a)(1) which contains two
violations; the impaired ability, or factual violation, and the per se violation.9
The jury verdict slip contained two options charging the defendant
with both the impaired ability violation and the per se violation.10 The jury
returned a verdict of not guilty for option one regarding the impaired ability
theory, but left the verdict slip blank for option two, the per se violation, and
as a result, the judge accepted the verdict for option one, and declared a

5 See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 312-13 (finding acquittal of only one charged violation will not
preclude retrial of other violation).
6
See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 309 (explaining defendant's involvement in accident).
7 See id. (noting treating physician's observations).
"[T]he defendant's skin appeared
'flushed' and that his speech was slurred, and [physician] detected an 'odor of alcohol on his
breath."' Id.
8 See id. (describing blood testing done by blood analyst in state police crime laboratory and
defenses' objections). Defense counsel urged the jury to find the blood alcohol tests were unreliable
based on the blood analyst's acknowledgement during cross examination that the blood samples
also contained an anticoagulant that, if not properly activated, would cause the blood to clot and
yield an artificially high blood alcohol test. Id.
9 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2017) (criminalizing operation of motor vehicle under
influence of alcohol). The impaired ability violation requires operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of intoxicating liquor and the per se violation requires operating a motor vehicle with a
blood alcohol level of .08 or more. Id.; see also Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 310 (explaining defendant's
charge under OUI Statute). The prosecution urged the jury to find the defendant guilty under both
theories. Hebb,77 N.E.3d at 310. Prosecution first argued the defendant's appearance and behavior
at the accident was sufficient evidence to find him guilty under the impaired ability violation. Id.
They then contended the defendant's .133 blood alcohol level was sufficient to prove the per se
violation as well. Id. at 311.
10
See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 310 (describing jury verdict slip and jury's decision-making
process).

The verdict slip conformed to the complaint, charging both the impaired ability violation
and the per se violation, and provided the jury the following options: (1) "Operating a
Motor Vehicle Under the Influence of Liquor: 1. Not Guilty; 2. Guilty"; and (II)
"Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Blood Alcohol Level of .08% or greater: 1. Not
Guilty; 2. Guilty."
Id.
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mistrial for option two." In December 2015, the prosecution issued a second
complaint against Hebb charging him solely with the per se violation.1 2
Confronted with this new complaint, Hebb moved to dismiss on grounds of
Double Jeopardy. 3 Hebb's Double Jeopardy claim did not prevail in the
district court, leading the judge to dismiss his case, and Hebb appealed to the
SJC.14

The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a criminal
defendant from being prosecuted for the same crime twice. Providing three
constitutional safeguards, the principle bars prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,
and multiple punishments for the same offense. 6 The Double Jeopardy
Clause is applicable to states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." In addition to the United States constitutional

11 See id. at 310 (outlining jury's deliberations and verdict). The jury reported that they saw
evidence concerning the second count which was meant to be redacted, and asked the judge how
to proceed. Id.
12 See id. (explaining second complaint charges). The defendant was charged with one
count
of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level percentage of .08 or greater, which is the per se
violation of M.G.L. c. 90 § 24 (1)(a)(1). Id.
'3 See Hebb, 77 N.E. 3d at 310 (articulating defendant's reasons for filing motion to dismiss).
14 See id. (outlining stages of case leading to appeal). "A second judge denied the motion, and
the defendant filed a petition pursuant to M.G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review of that judge's order."
Id.
15 See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,64 (1978) (explaining extent of Double Jeopardy
protections). Sanabria held that a verdict of acquittal is guaranteed the upmost Double Jeopardy
protection. Id. The scope of the Double Jeopardy clause even reaches acquittal based on
"egregiously erroneous foundation." Id. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977) ("It has long
been understood that separate statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent elements
or in actual proof in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.").
See Commonwealth v. Lowder, 731 NE.2d 510, 520 (Mass. 2000) (affirming constitutional right
to Double Jeopardy Protections). The prosecution attempted to argue because the judge had no
authority to enter a finding of not guilty, it was not a true acquittal. Id. The court affirmed, holding
although the trial judge lacked the power to enter the verdict, the prosecution was still barred from
seeking further proceedings against the defendant. Id. To do so, would put the defendant in
jeopardy twice for the same offense. Id. See Aldrich, 486 N.E.2d at 735 (quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)) (explaining principal purpose of Double Jeopardy clause). The
Double Jeopardy clause serves the purpose of "protect[ing] an individual from being subjected to
the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense." Id.
16 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (summarizing
Double Jeopardy as
safeguards). "That guarantee has been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections.
It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense." Id.; see also Brown, 24 N.E.3d at 1032 (quoting Yeager v.
United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009)) ("[T]he [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause precludes the
[g]ovemment fromrelitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior
trial.").
'7 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (declaring Double
Jeopardy principle
fundamental right). The court acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy principal
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safeguards, Massachusetts has both statutory and common law Double
Jeopardy principles that encompass the same standards and protections as
those outlined in the Fifth Amendment.18
For purposes of establishing whether Double Jeopardy principles
apply, the court must first determine whether original jeopardy has been
terminated. 19 A termination of original jeopardy requires all factual elements
of the charged offense charged to be resolved.2 0 A jury acquittal implies the
factual elements have been resolved, and therefore, subsequent prosecution
is barred but, it is conversely held that a mistrial resulting from a hung jury
is a fundamental ideal in constitutional heritage and, as such, should be applied through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see also Pearce,395 U.S. at 717 (affirming Fifth Amendment Double
Jeopardy guarantee enforceable against states through Fourteenth Amendment).
18 See MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 263 § 7 (Lexis Nexis 2017) (establishing Massachusetts Double
Jeopardy protections). The provisions state:
A person shall not be held to answer on a second indictment or complaint for a crime of
which he has been acquitted upon the facts and merits; but he may plead such acquittal
in bar of any subsequent prosecution for the same crime, notwithstanding any defect in
the form or substance of the indictment or complaint on which he was acquitted.
Id.;see also Marshall v. Commonwealth, 977 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Mass. 2012) (recognizing Double
Jeopardy principle's reach to Massachusetts state law). "At its core, the prohibition against double
jeopardy, which flows from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, well as the
statutory and common law of Massachusetts, provides that 'a person cannot twice be put in jeopardy
for the same offence."'Id.;Berry, 473 N.E.2d at 1119 (stating longstanding Double Jeopardy
principles in Commonwealth). Common law Double Jeopardy principles in Massachusetts may
provide for greater protection than what is required in both the State and Federal Constitution. Id.
19 See Ferrari v. Commonwealth, 859 N.E.2d 808,811 (Mass. 2007) (noting original jeopardy
terminates when proceedings against defendant ends);Commonwealth v Johnson, 689 N.E.2d 1327,
1333 (Mass. 1998) (quoting Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984)) (". . the
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event,
such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy.");Berry, 473 N.E.2d at 1118 (placing
importance of defendant's expectation on Double Jeopardy). "Whether the defendant's jeopardy
has terminated depends on whether, in light of double jeopardy policies and principles, the
proceedings against him have reached a point at which they should cease." Id.;Aldrich, 486 NE.2d
at 735 (turning on whether defendant expects further litigation to continue with the same question
as original jeopardy). "The dispositive issue is whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation
that the dismissal was a final disposition of the charges." Aldrich, 486 N.E.2d at 735.The court
ruled that the defendant's unreasonable belief that the dismissal of his complaint was a final
disposition of the case ultimately led to the denial of his Double Jeopardy claim. Aldrich, 486
N.E.2d at 736.
20 See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 118 (2009) (holding jury's inability to reach a
verdict does not bar further prosecution). "The interest in giving the prosecution one complete
opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws justifies treating the jury's inability to reach
a verdict as nonevent that does not bar retrial." Id.; see also Brown, 24 N.E.3d at 1032-34 (Mass.
2015) (determining acquittal is final when all factual elements of offense charged are resolved).
The court held that retrying a defendant for first degree murder under a theory of deliberate
premeditation did not violate Double Jeopardy principles. Id. at 1033. The court reasoned that
since the first trial did not produce a verdict which was based on all of the facts, the Jury's verdict
was not equivalent to a true acquittal. Id. at 1034.
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will not automatically terminate original jeopardy because the facts could
have possibly been unresolved. 2 1 The principles guiding whether original
jeopardy has terminated, and thus whether a new trial is precluded, weigh
the defendant's right to finality against the government's interest in receiving
a final judgment for those who have committed a crime against the public. 2 2
For purposes of Double Jeopardy, when a statute allows a defendant
to be charged under two separate theories of liability, the court must
determine whether the factual elements of one theory preclude a retrial under
an alternative theory. 23 To make this determination, the court looks to the
21 See Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
688-89 (1949))
(reiterating that hung jury will not bai further prosecution).
The Double-Jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment however, does not mean that
every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free
if the trial fails to end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable
obstacle to the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance of
the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition is aimed.
Id. at 324. The Court acknowledges certain circumstances could make it impossible for a jury to
reach a complete verdict on the merits of a case. Id. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy law is
two-fold: to protect society from those who commit crimes and to deny the government the
opportunity to further prosecute in instances where the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Id. at
325;United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91(1978) (stressing acquittal based on insufficient evidence
to convict terminates original jeopardy). The prejudice facing a defendant when being forced to
stand a new trial after acquittal far outweighs any prejudice the government might face after a
defendant successfully appeals. Id. at 91-92; see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580
(1824) (holding mistrial based on manifest necessity does not bar second trial)*Marshall,977
N.E.2d at 45 (noting exceptions of Double Jeopardy in mistrials). "State and Federal double
jeopardy protections bar, 'as a general rule,' retrial of a defendant whose initial trial ends over his
objection and without a conviction.... However, an exception to the general rule applies where a
mistrial is declared as a matter of 'manifest necessity'." Marshall,977 N.E.2d at 45; see also Erin
Miller, When are a
Mistrial and Retrial Double Jeopardy?, ScoTus BLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/when-are-a-mistrial-and-retrial-double-jeopardy/(2017)
(pointing to jury's inability to reach verdict as grounds for new trial);William S. McAninch,
Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C.L. REV. 411, 420 (1993) (describing mistrials and
Double Jeopardy). "Consequently, a subsequent prosecution on that indictment does not implicate
double jeopardy; it is simply a continuation of the original jeopardy. On the other hand, a mistrial
declared over the defendant's objection will terminate jeopardy unless the mistrial was required by
manifest necessity" Id.
22 See Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325-26 (explaining governmental interest in resolution). "[A]
defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances
be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." Id. at 325.
The government is equally as entitled to a resolution as the defendant and their interests are
comparable. Id. at 326; see also Brown, 24 N.E.3d at 1032 ("The defendants' Double Jeopardy
claim depends not on what the jury explicitly stated in the report of the verdict but on the
defendants' interpretation of what the jury must have intended.").
23 See Commonwealth v. Roderiques, 968 N.E.2d 908, 915 (Mass. 2012) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Santos, 797 N.E.2d 1191,1198 (Mass. 2003)) (differentiating alternative
methods of establishing criminal elements from alternative theories of liability). When the statute
sets out two methods of establishing a required element of a crime, it is not in fact, setting out
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legislative intent underlying the two theories and decides whether the
legislature intended to authorize multiple punishments for a single incident.
24 The Massachusetts OUI statute sets out two theories of liability, which
may be argued in the alternative, to convict for operating under the
influence.2 5 In 2003, the Massachusetts state legislature amended the OUI
statute to include the per se violation .26

alternative theories under which the crime can be committed. Id. Alternative methods of
establishing an element are "merely similar, equivalent types of conduct any one (or more) of which
will suffice to prove a single element." Id.
24 See Commonwealth v. Callahan, 799 N.E.2d 113,116 (Mass. 2003) ("We [also] presume
that when the Legislature amends a statute it is aware of the prior state of the law as explicated by
the decisions of this court."). See Commonwealth v. Traylor, 34 N.E.3d 276, 282-83 (Mass. 2015)
(determining what unit of prosecution was intended as punishable act). Courts draw a distinction
between crimes committed against several victims and crimes committed against society as a
whole. Id. Crimes committed against several victims warrant multiple indictments for the same
crime for each victim, but when a statute is directed at punishing the defendant for conduct against
society, a single violation of said statute can only result in one conviction regardless of how many
victims were affected. Id. See Commonwealth v. Botev, 945 N.E.2d 956, 961 (Mass. 2011)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Antonmarchi, 874 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (describing
importance of considering legislative intent).
The appropriate inquiry in a case like this . . . asks what 'unit of prosecution' was
intended by the Legislature as the punishable act.... The inquiry requires us to look to
the language and purpose of the statute[], to see whether [it] speak[s] directly to the issue
of the appropriate unit of prosecution ... keeping in mind that any ambiguity that arises
in the process must be resolved, under the rule of lenity, in the defendant's favor.
Id. See Sanabria v. United States 437 U.S. 54, 69 (1978) ("It is Congress, and not the prosecution,
which establishes and defines offenses."); Ohio, 432 U.S. at 165 ("The legislature remains free
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature
has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors
ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial.").
25 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2017) (stating two theories for prosecution); see also
Commonwealth v. Filoma, 943 N.E.2d 477, 481 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (explaining two theories
under OUI statute). The OUI statutes creates two approaches:
The Commonwealth could establish the OUI element by either of two methods. By the
"per se" method, it could introduce evidence of a breathalyzer reading of .08 percent or
greater and request the judge to instruct the jury that, if they believed the accuracy of
the
under
operation
established
conclusively
it
measure,
that
influence. Alternatively, by the method of proof by impaired operation, the prosecution
could introduce percipient evidence of the defendant's appearance and conduct and a
breathalyzer result of .08 percent or greater without a request for an instruction that such
a reading, if believed, conclusively established operation under the influence.
Filoma, 943 N.E.2d at 481; see also Commonwealth v. Colturi, 864 N.E.2d 498, 501-02 (Mass
2007) (analyzing statute under two alternative theories).
26 See Colturi, 864 N.E.2d at 501 (describing legislative intent behind amendment). "The
expressly stated purpose of the 2003 amendments was to 'avoid loss of life and the loss of federal
highway aid funds' by the prompt enactment of further provisions 'necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public safety."' Id. (citation omitted). "It is beyond reasonable dispute that, in
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In Hebb, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the
lower court's decision that the defendant's Double Jeopardy rights were not
violated by the commonwealth seeking further prosecution for only the per
se violation under the OUI statute. 27 The court affirmed the prosecution's
decision to charge Hebb for both violations, holding that each violation
contained their own distinct factual elements .2 Accordingly, the court
rejected the defendant's claim that the previous acquittal on the impaired
ability charge barred further prosecution with respect to the per se violation. 2 9
The court analogized it's holding to its previous application of Double
Jeopardy principles in murder trials prosecuted under multiple theories.30
Thus, the court ruled that Hebb's Double Jeopardy rights were not violated
because the judge's declaration of a mistrial based on the impaired ability
theory prevented the jury from resolving all of the factual elements of the
per se violation."
In Hebb, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied heavily
on the notion that the previous acquittal on the impaired ability OUI theory,
and the mistrial on the per se violation theory, did not bar further prosecution
and therefore Hebb's Double Jeopardy protections were not violated.3 2
While seemingly adhering to the traditional principle that a mistrial will not
adding a per se violation to the OUI statute, the Legislature intended to strengthen the protections
afforded the public from drivers who might be impaired by the consumption of alcohol." Id.
27 See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 309 (Mass. 2017) (concluding retrial permitted where jury reached
verdict on only one of two prosecuted theories).
28 See id. at 311 (describing two theories of prosecution under statute). The court explained
that "the statutory framework created by the 2003 amendment established alternative theories ...
each containing a factual element not necessary to prove the other." Id. The court held that the
decision to charge for each violation separately was appropriate and consistent with the intent
behind the 2003 amendment to protect public safety. Id.
29 See id. (rejecting defendant's claim of acquittal barring further prosecution). The court
reasoned "the jury's not guilty verdict on the impaired ability charge did not resolve the factual
element necessary to establish a per se violation. . . ." Id.
30 See id. ("Our conclusion that double jeopardy principles do not bar retrial on the per se
violation where the defendant was acquitted on the impaired ability violation is consistent with this
court's application of double jeopardy principles in cases involving trials for murder under multiple
theories."). The court relied on Commonwealth v. Zanetti which held that the defendant could be
retried for murder on a theory which the jury had not reached a verdict on in the first trial. See id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 910 N.E.2d 869, 878 (Mass. 2009)). The court also cited
Commonwealth v. Brown, which held that the Commonwealth could retry the defendant on the
theory of deliberate premeditation in first degree murder charge because the jury failed to reach a
verdict on the "facts and merits of the charge." Id. (citing Brown, 24 N.E.3d at 1034.
31 See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 311 (using declaration of mistrial as basis to bypass Double Jeopardy
rights).
32 See id. (ruling previous acquittal did not bar further prosecution). The court reasoned that
the jury's opportunity to determine whether Hebb operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol
level of .08 percent or greater was "foreclosed by the ruling of a mistrial." Id. Consequently, the
court reasoned double jeopardy did not bar the Commonwealth from prosecuting on the per se
theory alone. Id.
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bar further prosecution, the SJC failed to recognize the facts that made this
case distinguishable.3 3 The SJC expressly rejected the application of
Sanabria v. United StateS34 as controlling precedent, which led to their
skewed Double Jeopardy analysis. 35 As argued by the defense, the principles
set forth in Sanabria determine that Hebb's OUJI acquittal barred further
prosecution despite the Commonwealth's argument that the jury declared a
mistrial only on the per se theory. 6 Given the factual similarities between
Sanabriaand Hebb, the SJC's ruling should have been compelled to yield
the same result, which would have afforded Hebb complete Double
Jeopardy protection.3
3 See Perez, 22 U.S. at 580 (holding further prosecution not usually barred by mistrials). The
Court further held prosecution was not disallowed when a mistrial is called for manifest necessity.
Id. The Court expanded on the discretion judges have in making this decision, noting "whenever,
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for
the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." Id.; see also Miller, supra note
21(analyzing controlling Supreme Court precedent surrounding mistrials and Double Jeopardy).

The controlling Supreme Court precedent is United States v. Perez (1824), which held
that a second trial does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights as long as the
trial judge has declared a mistrial in the first proceeding based on "manifest necessity."
There is no mechanical formula to determine whether a new trial is a "manifest
necessity"; rather, in Perez, the Court merely required the trial judge to exercise "sound
discretion" in making that decision.
Miller, supra note 21..
34 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (discussing SJC holding).
3
See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 312 (noting "Because Sanabriais distinguishable from this case, it
does not advance the defendant's argument."). The court expressly disagreed with the defense's
contention that Sanabria served as controlling precedent. Id. The court argued Sanabria was
distinguishable because the judge "entered an acquittal on the entire count rather than only with
respect to one theory of liability." Id.
36 See Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 78 (using multiple theories to argue further prosecution barred
after acquittal). In Sanabria,the defendant was charged with participating in an illegal gambling
business in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1955. Id. at 56-57. The indictment charged the defendantunder
two theories of participation: accepting bets on number pools and the results of horse races. Id. at
58-59. The defendant was acquitted of the horse racing theory and appealed the judge's order
excluding the numbers pool evidence and pursued a new trial on that evidence alone. Id. at 60-61,
64. The Supreme Court ruled the second prosecution was barred under Double Jeopardy principles.
Id. at 75.
37 See id. at 72-73 (highlighting prosecution's argument).
While recognizing that only a single violation of the statute is alleged under either theory,
the Government nevertheless contends that separate counts would have been proper . . ..
[the] petitioner here was acquitted for insufficient proof of an element of the crime which
other counts would share-that he was "connected with' the single gambling business."
This finding of fact stands as an absolute bar to any further prosecution for participation
in that business.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 309-10 (describing defendant's charges).
Although the defendant was charged under two theories, the charge was for a single count of OUI.
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Moreover, in analyzing the legislative intent behind the 2003
amendment to the OUI statute, the court failed to give appropriate weight to
the statute's increased reliance on blood alcohol content in determining
whether a defendant was under the influence of alcohol.38 The court's failure
to provide a complete analysis of this intention, consequently, led to their
inaccurate interpretation that the per se and impaired ability theories
constitute separate offenses, allowing for multiple prosecutions." Thus,
analogizing the OUI statute in Hebb to previous murder cases involving
multiple theories of prosecution was not a suitable comparison because the
factual impairment and the per se violation are ways of proving a single
element of the same offense." This misinterpretation of the legislature's
Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 309-10. The prosecution's argument that an acquittal on one theory did not bar
further prosecution on another after the jury declared a mistrial is exactly what was argued in
Sanabria.See id. at 311-12.
3 See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d at 310-11 (highlighting intent behind legislature passing amendment).
The Court claimed the decision to charge Hebb under both theories was consistent with the
legislative purpose of the statute's amendment which they explain as being "to minimize the risk
to public safety from drivers who are either actually impaired or presumed to be impaired based on
their blood alcohol level." Id. But see Colturi, 864 N.E.2d at 500-01 (noting abandonment of
previous permissible inference standard).
[T]he [Massachusetts] Legislature added language to the OUI statute, making it a
violation to operate a motor vehicle not only under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
but also with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more. Having added this language to the
violation provision of the statute, the Legislature deleted language in § 24(1)(e) that had
created a "permissible inference that person with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more
was indeed "under the influence of intoxicating liquor."
Colturi, 864 N.E.2d at 500-01 (citation omitted). By abandoning the permissible influence standard
the court increased the weight of blood alcohol content as evidence as a way to prove a defendant's
intoxication more definitively. Id.
3 See Hebb, 77 NE.3d at 311 (holding double jeopardy does not bar retrial on per se
violation); see also Traylor, 34 N.E.3d at 283 (explaining need for analysis of unit of prosecution
intended by statute). An important distinction must occur when determining whether a single
statute can give rise to multiple offenses or one continuing offense. Traylor, 34 N.E.3d at 283. The
court distinguishes between crimes offensive to society and crimes of violence which are
committed against several victims. Id. The latter groups of cases, such as homicide cases, warrant
multiple convictions and thus it is not necessary to implicate double jeopardy principles when the
prosecution fails on one theory and pursues another in subsequent prosecution. Id. In upholding
multiple convictions based on two deaths from a vehicular homicide, the court ruled the offense
"falls within the general category of homicide offenses and those offenses traditionally have
permitted punishment for each death caused by a defendant's criminal conduct." Id. at 268. In
cases involving punishing the defendant for conduct offensive to society, the Court holds "a single
instance of unlawful conduct can support only a single conviction, even if it affected several
victims" Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
40 See Roderiques, 968 N.E.2d at 915 (quoting Santos, 797 N.E.2d at 1198)("[A]ltemative
methods of establishing a required element are not distinct 'theories' of how the crime may be
committed, but are merely similar, equivalent types of conduct any one (or more) of which will
suffice to prove a single element."); see also Zanetti, 910 NE.2d at 877-78 (allowing for retrial on
alternative theory of homicide). The jury slip in this case provided the following options "(1) 'Not
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intention behind amending the statute led to the court's futile conclusion that
the factual and per se violations were separate offenses, which allowed the
Commonwealth to pursue further prosecution for the same episode of
operating a motor vehicle under the influence.4 1
Furthermore, in Hebb, the SJC acknowledged the application of the
Double Jeopardy clause's protection when original jeopardy has been
terminated; however, they failed to appropriately apply this standard to the
facts of the case. 42 The termination of original jeopardy is fatal to the
Commonwealth's ability to pursue further prosecution. 43 Since the intended
unit of prosecution under the OUI statute was one episode of driving under
the influence, it therefore follows that the SJC was wrong in finding the
jury's acquittal on the factual violation as not terminating original jeopardy."
Guilty'; (2) 'Guilty - Murder, First Degree,' and, indented and underneath, the choices of (a)
'Theory of Deliberate Premeditation (Principal),' and (b) 'Theory of Deliberate Premeditation
(Joint Venture)'; (3) 'Guilty - Murder, Second Degree (Principal)'; and (4) 'Guilty - Murder,
Second Degree (Joint Venture).' Zanetti, 910 N.E.2d at 878. The jury's verdict of guilty under
the joint venture theory did not preclude further prosecution under the theory of Deliberate
Premeditation. Id.
41 See Hebb, 77 N.E. 3d at 310-11 (holding Double Jeopardy principles were not violated).
The court determined that each theory consisted of entirely separate offenses stating, "to prove a
per se violation of the OUI statute, the Commonwealth need not establish that the defendant was
under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Id. Further, the court concluded that the legislative
intent allowed for this interpretation creating two separate units of prosecution allowing for further
prosecution. Id.; see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 164 (prohibiting courts from dividing a crime into
multiple units). "The Double Jeopardy clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can
avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or
spatial units." Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 (citation omitted).
42 See Hebb, 77 N.E.3d 308 at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 689 N.E.2d at
1133) ("the protection of the [diouble [j]eopardy [c1lause by its terms applies only if there had been
some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy."). The SJC contends
original jeopardy was not terminated by Mr. Hebb's acquittal of the factual impairment violation.
Id. Further, the court purported that the declaration of a mistrial on the per se violation was wholly
separate from the acquittal, thus further prosecution was not barred. Id.
43 See Ferrari,859 N.E.2d at 811 (failing to apply double jeopardy protection when jury is
unable to reach unanimous decision). "Original jeopardy terminates when proceedings against a
defendant end. However, as the defendant concedes, if the Commonwealth presents legally
sufficient evidence to convict, double jeopardy will not prevent retrial after a mistrial is declared
because of the jury's inability to reach a unanimous decision." Id.; see also Lowder, 731 N.E.2d at
520 ("When a defendant has been put in jeopardy for an offense and acquitted, he may not be retried
for that offense."); Aldrich, 486 N.E.2d at 735 (finding expectation of further prosecution indicates
original jeopardy has not been terminated). The defendant in this case did not have a reasonable
belief that the proceedings were over, therefore the court affirmed further prosecution as not being
in violation of double jeopardy principles. Aldrich, 486 N.E.2d at 735; Berry, 473 N.E.2d at 1118
("In order for a defendant to be placed twice in jeopardy, his original jeopardy must have
terminated.").
4 See Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (using consecutive sentences as a measure of whether successive
prosecutions would be allowed). In Brown, the defendant was charged for stealing an automobile
after he had pled guilty to operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. Id. at 163. The
defendant argued that double jeopardy applied because the subsequent prosecution arose from the
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The SJC's contention that Double Jeopardy did not apply was rooted in their
misinterpretation that Hebb's acquittal had no bearing on the judge's
declaration of a mistrial, when in fact, the acquittal effectively terminated
jeopardy on both theories.45
In Commonwealth v. Hebb, the Massachusetts SJC discussed the
issue of whether double jeopardy principles preclude the Commonwealth
from retrying a defendant for a charge under the Massachusetts OUI statute
on the theory of a per se violation after a judge declared a mistrial and after
the jury acquitted the defendant on the impaired ability violation of the
statute. The SJC failed to apply United States Supreme Court precedent in
Sanabriav. UnitedStates. In doing so, the SJC misinterpreted the legislative
intent behind the 2003 amendment of G.L.c. 90 § 24 (1)(a)(1), which added
the per se violation language. The SJC wrongfully treated the two theories
under the statute as alternative offenses rather than two ways of proving one
incident of operating under the influence. Consequently, the SJC violated
the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to protection against double jeopardy
by allowing the government to pursue further prosecution.
Kathryn Witham

same incident as the charge he already pled guilty to. Id. The court ruled when two theories are the
same for purposes of barring consecutive sentences in one trial, then successive prosecutions for
each theory will also be barred. Id. at 166.
45 See Berry, 473 N.E.2d at 1118 (finding mistrials not always dispositive of allowing further
prosecution). When the prosecution has had a full opportunity to obtain a conviction and the
defendant is acquitted, the judge's declaration of a mistrial will have no bearing on the bar for
further prosecution under double jeopardy principles. Id. The court in Berry ruled that a subsequent
prosecution would essentially be giving the government an unfair bite at the apple, a right that has
been historically unavailable to defendants. Id.; see also Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 142 ("[Double
jeopardy was] violated when the Court of Appeals set aside the judgement of acquittal and directed
that petitioners be tried again for the same offense."). Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143. An acquittal is
final and is non-reviewable without putting a defendant in jeopardy. Id. Even if the acquittal is
based upon an "egregiously erroneous" foundation, original jeopardy is terminated. Id.

